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Introduction
Measles is an extremely contagious disease that has been resurgent in the US and
globally in 2019.1 Over 1200 cases of measles were reported in the US in 2019, the
most since 1992.2 Approximately 10% of these cases have led to hospitalization, 5%
of which had complications including pneumonia and encephalitis.3 Measles can
compromise an individual’s immune system, potentially causing problems after
recovery,4, 5 and may also lead to death.6
Fortunately, immunity to measles is conferred to 97% of people who receive 2
doses of the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine. In the US, the first dose
is recommended at 12 months and the second before starting school.7 As measles
is highly infectious, 92%-96% of a homogeneously mixed population should be
vaccinated to achieve herd immunity.8
Vaccination rates were sufficiently high to eliminate measles in the US (meaning
no continuous transmission within the US for at least 12 months) in 2000.9
Subsequent decreases in vaccination rates in some areas have facilitated measles
transmission, putting the US’s elimination status in jeopardy.10 The US marginally
retained its elimination status in 2019.11
In the US, schoolchildren must either be vaccinated against measles or obtain a
vaccine exemption. Requirements for acquiring a vaccine exemption vary by state,
however, and 45 of the 50 states allow exemptions for nonmedical reasons as of
May 2020.12
A small minority of parents refuse vaccinations for their children and seek
exemptions for nonmedical reasons, including concerns about the perceived safety
of vaccines, a lack of knowledge concerning vaccines, a low perceived susceptibility
to measles, and social influences.13,14 Vaccine hesitancy, defined as the “delay in
acceptance or refusal of vaccination despite availability of vaccination services,”15 is
not evenly distributed in the population, leading to geographic clusters of
unvaccinated children.16,17 This clustering potentially would allow measles to spread
in a community that has a vaccination rate above the herd-immunity threshold.18
Three measles outbreaks in Washington (Clark County) and New York (Rockland
County and New York City) states in 2019 infected 71, 312, and 649 people,19-21
respectively. Local government enacted public health interventions in each area with
the aim of limiting the spread of measles. These interventions included suspending
unvaccinated students from schools19,22-24 and mandatory vaccinations.25 Other
interventions included contract tracing,9,20 free vaccination clinics,25 and prohibiting
unvaccinated minors from entering places of public assembly 23 (the last was
rescinded after a court challenge26). An overview of public health interventions for
measles outbreaks is given by Gastañaduy et al.27
Beyond these states, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the ability and
willingness of many governments to limit school attendance to control the spread of
an infectious disease (eg, Governor of the State of Texas28), albeit with significant
concerns.29,30
Texas is the most populous American state that allows nonmedical vaccine
exemptions. Its vaccine laws have been found to be among the least effective in the
US at reducing vaccine exemptions.31 Nonmedical vaccine exemptions have
increased annually in Texas32 since a law change in 2003 made it easier to opt out
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of vaccination.33 Studies have raised concerns about the potential for measles
outbreaks in Texas.32-35
We simulated measles outbreaks in 6 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of
Texas using an agent-based model. The model included the location, enrollment size,
and vaccination rates of the schools in each MSA. Public health interventions in which
unvaccinated students were either suspended from school, vaccinated, or both were
included in the simulations to evaluate how successful different interventions may be
in reducing the overall number of measles cases.

Methods
Agent-based model
We forecast the spread of measles under different public health interventions with
an agent-based model. The agent-based model was developed using FRED (A
Framework for Reconstructing Epidemiological Dynamics).36 The simulations follow
the approach discussed in Sinclair et al34; we summarize the key features of the
simulation model here, with some updates from the model previously discussed,34
including the addition of 6 public health intervention scenarios.
We chose 6 MSAs in Texas to simulate measles outbreaks: Austin-Round RockGeorgetown; Dallas-Fort Worth; Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown; Midland; and Tyler.
These MSAs have previously been identified as having a risk of larger measles
outbreaks than other areas in Texas.34,35
An MSA is a geographically contiguous group of one or more counties with close
economic and social ties37; these ties (such as commuting) may allow an infectious
disease to spread within an MSA more readily than to external areas. Dallas-Fort
Worth and Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown are the fourth and fifth largest MSAs in the
US, respectively. The member counties of each MSA are periodically updated by the
United States Census Bureau; these simulations use the September 2018
boundaries.38
FRED uses a synthetic population of the United States based on the 2010
census.39,40 Each member of the US population is represented by an agent. Each
agent is assigned a household location based on the population size of each US
census block. The characteristics of each agent are drawn from the distribution of
the population’s characteristics in each geographic area. This allows the agents in
any geographical area to be representative of the real-life population. These
characteristics are age, gender, race, household size, and household income.
Agents were assigned to schools or workplaces depending on their age and
employment rates. Agents representing school students were assigned to public or
private schools, with a probability weighted by their demographic characteristics.39,40
Each school in the model corresponds to a real-world equivalent, at the same
location and with the same age range and student enrollment.39,40 Agents
representing workers were assigned to workplaces based on commuting patterns
and the distribution of workplace sizes.
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Distribution
1
2
3

Table 1. Contact distributions
Household
Neighborhood
30
33
23
35.34
12
39

School
24.67
27
30.67

Workplace
12.33
14.67
18.33

Transmission
Agents in our model sequentially attended 3 mixing locations each simulated day:
their household, school or workplace, and neighborhood (agents representing the
unemployed and retired did not attend a school or workplace). Agents could come
into contact with one another if they were simultaneously located in the same place.
These contacts allowed measles to potentially spread among the population.
The basic reproduction number, R0, is the average number of new infections that
will occur from a single case being introduced to an entirely susceptible population.
For measles, R0, has been found to be approximately 12–18,41,42 although studies
have found outbreaks beyond this range.43 We calibrated the transmissibility of
measles in our model using a simulated entirely susceptible population of AustinRound Rock-Georgetown. The transmissibility determines the probability that an
infectious contact will be made between an infectious and a susceptible agent, if they
are co-located in a mixing location (household, school, workplace, and
neighborhood).
Previous infectious disease studies have attempted to quantify the relative
number of infections that occur in different locations where people interact. We
primarily assume that during an outbreak in a hypothetical entirely susceptible
population, 30% of transmissions would occur in households, 33% in neighborhoods,
and 37% in schools and workplaces; with twice the per-capita transmission rate in
schools relative to workplaces44,45 (we refer to this as “contact distribution 1”).
Relative contact rates calculated by Bayham and Fenichel46 were also used for
further simulations of Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. The proportion of infections
occurring in the household were set to the upper and lower boundaries calculated by
Bayham and Fenichel (“contact distribution 2” and “contact distribution 3”), and the
remaining transmission proportions were redistributed between neighborhoods,
schools, and workplaces (relative to the proportions used by Ferguson et al 45). The
3 distributions of contact rates are given in Table 1. Changing contact rates can alter
the transmissibility of measles in our models. Calibration simulations were run with
each contact distribution using 1000 simulations in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown.
In each simulation, schools are closed on weekends, only agents designated as
weekend workers (assumed to be 20% of workers) attended their workplaces on
weekends, and neighborhood contact rates were assumed to double on weekends
compared to weekdays.
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Vaccination rates
Simulations used 2 sets of vaccination rates. The first used the reported 2018
vaccination rates. If vaccination rates continue to fall, we assume that the fall will be
concentrated in schools that are undervaccinated in 2018; therefore, the second set
decreases vaccination rates by 5% in only the schools that are undervaccinated in
2018, while keeping the others constant. In Texas, 0.2% of students are medically
ineligible for vaccination.47 Assuming a 0.2% uncertainty on this value, we assume
any school with a vaccination rate under 99.6% is undervaccinated.
The MMR vaccine is 97% effective at conferring immunity to measles with the
recommended 2 doses; a single dose provides immunity to 93% of recipients.7
We vaccinated the school-attending agents according to the published
vaccination rate48 of the real-world equivalent to their simulated school. Privateschool vaccination rates are published individually in Texas, but public-school rates
are only published on the school district level. We assumed that all public schools in
a district had the same vaccination rate.
Not all schools and school districts report their vaccination rates, despite this
being mandatory.48 Vaccination rates for these schools and school districts were
estimated using the distribution of vaccination rates of nearby schools and districts,
with the method discussed in Sinclair et al.34
We assume all agents representing people born before 1957 are immune to
measles due to prior exposure, in line with Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) assumptions.49 Agents in the synthetic population are assigned
ages rather than birth dates; we defined agents who are aged 62 or older as those
who were born before 1957 (this corresponds to being born before 1957 on January
1, 2019).
94.8% of the rest of the agents (ie, not school-attending or aged 62 or older) were
assumed to be vaccinated, using findings from an antibody seroprevalence
analysis50 and an assumed 97% vaccination efficacy. This was also the vaccination
rate assumed for the 2.2% of school-aged agents in the model designated as homeschooled.40

Measles model
Measles infection was modeled as having 6 stages: an initial incubation period of
11.50 ± 1.23 days (median, dispersion of a lognormal distribution); a 1-day latent
phase; a 3-day fever phase; a 4-day rash phase; a 10-day recovery phase; and an
indefinite immune phase.51 Agents in the latent, fever, and rash phases could infect
other, susceptible agents. Fifty percent and 95% of agents in the fever phase and
rash phase, respectively, confined themselves to their household.
Measles was introduced at the start of each simulation to one school student for
whom a vaccine had been refused. We record the total number of measles cases
among students for whom a vaccine has been refused for nonmedical reasons
(“refusers”) and other members of the population (“bystanders”), comprising those
for whom vaccination failed to confer immunity, those who are medically ineligible,
and unvaccinated members of the population who do not attend school.
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Outbreaks were simulated for 270 days, corresponding to approximately the
length of a school year (the daily interactions of students may differ during the
summer vacation).

Interventions
In simulations where a measles outbreak occurred (defined as 3 or more cases
linked in time and place3), we evaluated different public health intervention scenarios
targeting unvaccinated school students. Interventions were either triggered in only
the schools with at least one measles case (on the first day of a student entering the
rash stage) or in all schools across the MSA (on the first day that a third agent in the
MSA entered the rash stage). Interventions were not triggered if fewer than 3 cases
occurred in the simulation run.
Two types of interventions were simulated: suspension from school and mass
vaccination. These follow 2 strategies employed in Washington and New York states’
2018-2019 outbreaks.19,22,24,25
For suspensions, all unvaccinated students did not attend school as part of their
weekday routines (but continued to interact with other agents in their households and
neighborhoods). This comprised both students for whom a vaccine had been refused
and medically exempt students. Students were suspended until 21 simulated days
passed without any rash cases among agents at their school or in the MSA (for the
school-specific and MSA-wide interventions, respectively). Twenty-one days is the
upper limit on incubation time for measles, thus reducing the risk of susceptible
students returning to school while another student has been exposed to measles but
is not yet symptomatic.
Recognizing that policymakers may feel pressured to readmit students to schools
without measles cases during an MSA-wide intervention, we also simulated an
intervention where all unvaccinated students were initially suspended on the
declaration of an outbreak. Students were then readmitted to individual schools after
21 days, or 21 days after the last measles case appeared in their school. Students
were suspended again if measles presented in their school.
It may be considered unjust to mandate the suspension of students who are
medically exempt from vaccination. Additional simulations in one MSA (AustinRound Rock-Georgetown) were run in which only refusers were suspended (and not
medically exempt students) to provide a comparison of potential outbreak sizes.
The second intervention explored was the vaccination of students for whom a
vaccine had previously been refused. Medically exempt students were not
vaccinated. In simulations where outbreaks occurred, unvaccinated students took 1–
7 days (randomly drawn from a uniform distribution) to receive a vaccination and a
further 11–24 days (random, uniform distribution) for the vaccine to succeed or fail.52
Immunity was conferred to 93% of newly vaccinated agents, matching the efficacy
of one dose of the MMR vaccine to confer immunity.7
Each intervention was simulated 1000 times in 6 Texas MSAs at 2018 vaccination
rates. Further simulations explored a scenario in which the vaccination rate of each
school that is undervaccinated in 2018 drops 5%. Simulations with no interventions
were also run.
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Both intervention types (suspension and vaccination) represent idealized
scenarios. In the school suspension scenario, it assumes that measles cases are
identified on the first day of the rash stage and that all schools and students are
compliant with the suspension. Not all schools were initially compliant with an order
to suspend students in the 2018–2019 Rockland County outbreak.53 We also do not
account for any possible increase in out-of-school interactions between suspended
students. In the vaccination case, it assumes parents who have previously chosen
not to vaccinate their children will do so in the event of an outbreak. While there is
some recent evidence of mass vaccine uptake during outbreaks in undervaccinated
communities,3,54,55 it is unlikely that all children will be vaccinated, even if vaccination
is mandatory.
The potential benefit of alternative interventions, contact tracing and high
vaccination coverage prior to outbreaks, have previously been investigated with an
early version of the FRED agent-based model framework.56

Statistical Analysis
FRED simulations are stochastic: the number of agents infected with measles in
each outbreak is dependent on which agent is the primary case. Our simulations
randomly select a student for whom a vaccine has been refused to be the primary
case. If this student attends a school with many other susceptible students, a large
outbreak may ensue. Alternatively, if the primary case occurs in the only
unvaccinated student in a school, it is less likely that the primary case will infect many
other students, resulting in a smaller number of cases.
As we aim to evaluate the potential benefits of different public health
interventions, we focus on the plausible worst-case scenario. We consider the
plausible worst-case scenario to be the number of cases at the 95th percentile (ie,
1-in-20 measles introductions) when the simulation results are ordered by the total
number of measles cases. Uncertainties on the 95th percentile were evaluated with
a nonparametric bootstrap estimate on the simulation results (1000 samples, each
of size 1000).

Results
Public health interventions which suspend, vaccinate, or both suspend and vaccinate
students from school during measles outbreaks are associated with statistically
significant reductions in the potential number of cases (see Figure 1 for forecasts in
Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown, and Appendixes 1 and 2 for all 6 MSAs).
Suspending unvaccinated students from school during an outbreak is forecast to
be the most effective single intervention, reducing the number of infections in a
plausible worst-case scenario by 96.6 (95.5–97.4)% (median, confidence interval).
At 2018 vaccination rates, the 95th percentile forecast outbreak sizes are similar
regardless of whether the suspension applies only in schools that students with
measles attend, to all schools in an MSA, or if the suspension is initially MSA-wide
and followed by a staggered readmission in schools without measles. For example,
in the Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown MSA, a forecast 527 (466–572) cases if there
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates

(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools
Figure 1. Forecast number of measles cases with a range of public health interventions.
Forecasts use (a) 2018 school vaccination rates, and (b) if vaccination rates drop 5% in
schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Interventions comprise suspending and
vaccinating unvaccinated students if measles cases are present in their school or
metropolitan area. Results are for the Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the number of
measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5-95% confidence
interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are forecast
for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the population
(“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”). Forecasts for 5 other MSAs are
provided in Appendixes 1 and 2.
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates

(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools
Figure 2. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions in the
Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Forecasts use (a)
2018 school vaccination rates, and (b) if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools which, in
2018, are undervaccinated. The total number of days each unvaccinated student was
suspended from their school was summed for 4 intervention scenarios which mandate
student suspensions. Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the number of
measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5-95% confidence
interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are forecast
for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the population
(“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”). Forecasts of total student-days
suspended for 5 other MSAs are provided in Appendixes 3 and 4.
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is no intervention are reduced to 19 (17–21), 18 (16–20), and 17 (15–20) cases with
the respective suspensions, at 2018 vaccination rates (Appendix 1).
Suspending unvaccinated students from schools with measles cases reduces (in
a plausible worst-case scenario) measles cases by 68%–96% of the cases without
an intervention, in the 4 MSAs which have the largest forecast outbreaks. The benefit
is reduced in MSAs with smaller forecast outbreaks (dropping to 82% and 55% in
Beaumont-Port Arthur and Midland, respectively). Suspension interventions reduce
cases by 97%–98% if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools undervaccinated in 2018.
If vaccination rates drop 5%, the MSA-wide suspension intervention is associated
with a statistically significant reduction compared to the other suspension
interventions in each MSA evaluated (suspending students in schools with measles
and suspending students in all schools, followed by a staggered readmission in
measles-free schools). For example, in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown, not
intervening could see 1503 (1295–1691) cases, whereas suspending unvaccinated
students across the MSA reduces this to 24 (21–26); suspending students only in
schools with measles and a staggered readmission of students from an MSA-wide
suspension are associated with 34 (31–39) and 29 (27–33) cases, respectively (see
Appendix 2).
Vaccinating eligible students is also associated with a reduction in outbreak sizes,
albeit less so than suspending students. In half of the MSAs, vaccinating during an
outbreak anywhere in the MSA forecasts fewer cases than vaccinating only in
schools with measles cases (at 2018 vaccination rates); the outbreak sizes are
forecast to be similar in the other half. If vaccination rates drop 5%, the worst-case
outbreak sizes in the MSA vaccination intervention drops by 31%–78% compared to
the size of the school-only vaccination intervention.
The combined interventions, in which students are both suspended and
vaccinated, are not associated with further reductions in the worst-case number of
infections at 2018 vaccination rates, compared to only suspending students. The
same applies if vaccination rates drop 5%.
The total number of school days missed by suspended students for 4 intervention
scenarios are given in Figure 2 for Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown (other MSAs
given in Appendixes 3 and 4). At both 2018 and reduced vaccination rates,
suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA leads to approximately 10–100
times more missed school days than targeting schools with measles cases. At 2018
vaccination rates, suspending all unvaccinated students in Houston-Sugar LandBaytown could result in more than 1.1 million student days lost in school, in a
plausible worst-case outbreak. This would be reduced to under 5000 if only schools
with measles cases were targeted.
We did not find a statistically significant difference in the potential worst-case
outbreak sizes whether medically ineligible students were included in suspension
policies or not (at the 2018 or the reduced vaccination rates) (Figure 3 and Appendix
5).

Alternative contact distributions
The distribution of R0 values for each calibrated set of contact distributions are
provided in Table 2. The distributions are generated from the 1000 simulations for
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(a) 2018 vaccination rates

(b) 5% reduction in vaccination rates in 2018 under-vaccinated schools
Figure 3. Forecast outbreak sizes comparing applying intervention policies only to “refusers”
(students for whom a vaccine has been refused) and to all unvaccinated students (ie, including
medically ineligible students). Policies comprise suspending and vaccinating unvaccinated
students if measles cases are present in their school or metropolitan area. Forecasts are shown
for Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. Bars indicate the median and interquartile range of the
number of measles cases from 1000 simulations in each MSA. Whiskers show the 5%-95%
confidence interval; we assume the upper end to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Cases are
forecast for students for whom a vaccine has been refused (“refusers”) and the rest of the
population (“bystanders”) as well as the combined population (“all”).
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each contact distribution. The R0 values for each of the contact distributions are
similar.
At 2018 vaccination rates, contact distribution 3 forecasts fewer cases than
contact distribution 1 in the “no intervention” case, with 415 (348–451) and 527 (466–
572) cases, respectively (Appendix 6). However, there is no significant difference in
the number of cases between any of the contact distributions when interventions are
enacted at 2018 or reduced vaccination rates.

Refusers and Bystanders
Across all simulations where 25 or more cases are forecast (including each
intervention), 58 (46–70)% (mean, SD) of measles infections occur in children for
whom a vaccine has been refused, with 42 (30–54)% occurring in other people (ie,
bystanders). For simulations with 3–24 cases, the percentage of infections among
refusers was 48 (24–72)% (mean, SD). With contact distribution 2, the forecast
fraction of cases in bystanders were 42 (30–54)% (>24 cases) and 46 (23–69)% (3–
24 cases), and for contact distribution 3: 37 (26–48)% and 43 (20–66)%,
respectively.

Discussion
Our simulations suggest that the public health interventions applied may significantly
reduce the potential size of measles outbreaks in 6 Texas metropolitan areas, with
a 68%–96% reduction in areas with the largest potential outbreak sizes. If we
assume that similar findings would be found across the US, the interventions enacted
in Clark County, Rockland County, and New York City during their 2018–2019
outbreaks may have been effective at limiting the spread of measles.
Our results suggest that suspending unvaccinated students from schools is
associated with fewer total measles cases than vaccinating susceptible students
during an outbreak (however, both are beneficial). This may be due to several
causes, but an important factor is likely to be the time delay between deciding to
seek a vaccine and gaining immunity. This period, taking 1 to 4 weeks in these
simulations, leaves students vulnerable to infection at the beginning of the outbreak.
Additionally, the 93% success rate of one dose of the MMR vaccine means 7% of
unvaccinated students effectively take no action to lessen their chance of infection.
Suspending students across an MSA appears to have little advantage over
suspending students only in schools with measles cases at 2018 vaccination rates;
however, a significant benefit is predicted if vaccination rates drop 5% in
undervaccinated schools. Alternatively, if vaccination rates drop, initially suspending
all unvaccinated students in an MSA, before readmitting students in schools without
measles cases, may reduce the total number of measles cases compared to only
ever suspending students in schools with measles cases, but less successfully than
suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA.
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Table 2. Distribution of R0 values from 1000 calibration simulations with a completely
susceptible population for the 3 contact distributions provided in Table 1
Distribution
Min
Quartile 1
Median
Quartile 3
Max
1
12
12.86
13.30
13.74
15
2
12
12.81
13.25
13.74
16
3
12
12.80
13.32
13.78
15

The advantage of suspending all unvaccinated students in an MSA is that they
are not attending a school if someone presents there with measles (except for the
cases before an outbreak is declared). If students are only suspended from schools
once an enrolled student is identified as having measles, there may have been
opportunities for infections. However, these simulations suggest this does not lead
to significantly more infections in a plausible worst-case scenario. This may be due
to the relatively long incubation time for measles (up to 21 days3). Quickly
suspending all unvaccinated students in a school limits the opportunity for measles
to spread within a school, as only the original infectious student (and any vaccinated
students without immunity) will ever potentially attend the school while infectious.
On the other hand, if vaccination rates drop, there is a much larger number of
susceptible students in some schools, all of whom have the chance to become
infected by the school’s initial measles case before anyone is suspended. This might
lead to a greater number of measles cases in the community and potentially leads
to more infections occurring outside of schools.
Nonmedical vaccine exemptions have increased annually since 2003 in Texas,
suggesting that, unless something occurs to change vaccine perceptions, MSA-wide
interventions may become optimal in the future. Drops in vaccination rates may be
compounded as the fraction of the population born before 1957 (who are all
presumed immunized due to prior exposure49) decreases with time.
Both suspending and vaccinating unvaccinated students does not yield any
significant reduction in cases compared to only suspending unvaccinated students
at 2018 vaccination rates, but does if vaccination rates drop. This suggests that
stronger interventions be used in areas with lower vaccination rates.
Despite not appearing to further reduce outbreak sizes, vaccinating unvaccinated
students who are suspended is nevertheless beneficial to the students and the wider
population. Newly vaccinated students are unlikely to be infected in future outbreaks
and therefore unlikely to infect anyone else. Newly vaccinated students may also be
able to return to schools sooner than waiting out an epidemic at home. It also may
be beneficial to vaccinate students if an outbreak occurs anywhere in their MSA, if
suspension interventions are only applied in schools where measles cases are
recorded (a scenario that has not been investigated here).
Suspending students is likely to be easier to implement than vaccinating students
for whom a vaccine has previously been refused: even with a mandatory vaccination
order, there were ethical and practical issues with enacting New York City’s
vaccination policy25 (a debate that is also playing out in other countries which
recently introduced mandatory vaccination laws57,58). However, if out-of-school
interactions increase among suspended students, then suspending students may
not be as effective as predicted. It may be beneficial to encourage those responsible
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for the suspended students to restrict the students’ interactions, especially among
their peers, to prevent the potential spread of measles outside of schools.
Interventions targeted at specific schools are also likely to be easier to implement
than MSA-wide interventions. It will require fewer resources to check that action has
been taken at a subset of the schools than all of the schools. Furthermore, the
number of school days lost through suspension is greatly reduced if suspensions are
targeted at schools with measles cases, compared to applying them to all schools.
Additionally, MSAs are not a government level of power. Health departments
operate on county, state, and national levels (albeit some MSAs are only one county
in size). This may cause obstacles to enacting MSA-wide interventions quickly in the
event of an outbreak. To preempt potential problems, county or state health
departments should ensure they have measles outbreak intervention policies
prepared and coordinated across county lines in advance of a measles outbreak.
It is unlikely that any intervention effort will have a 100% compliance rate and
accurately identify all measles cases. These forecasts are therefore for idealized
scenarios; the potential number of measles cases may be higher in reality.
There was no statistically significant difference found between the potential
number of measles cases when all unvaccinated students (ie, refusers and medically
ineligible students), or only refusers, were suspended. As no greater risk to the
general population was found, it may be equitable to allow these students to attend
school during outbreaks during a suspension intervention. However, there would be
a risk of infection for these students, and the option for parents/guardians to isolate
them, and thus reduce infection risk, should also be considered.
Our model evenly distributes medically ineligible students across schools: if a
school had a higher concentration of students, it might be at risk of larger outbreaks.
This should be evaluated when deciding if medically ineligible students should stay
home from school or not.
The similarities in results between the 3 contact distributions suggest that the
benefit of each intervention would be robust across a range of communities that may
have different contact distributions.
The 2-dose effectiveness of the MMR vaccine is taken to be 97%, as reported by
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices7; however, studies have found
values for the 2-dose effectiveness ranging from 67%–100%.59-64 If a higher
effectiveness was used in our simulations, we would expect the forecast number of
cases in each scenario to be reduced, especially among “bystanders” (those whose
vaccine failed). We would also expect vaccination interventions to improve more than
school suspension interventions. However, given the much smaller number of cases
forecast with school suspension interventions, we would still expect these to be
advantageous compared to vaccination interventions.

Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. Primarily, all models necessarily simplify
the real-life system they are modeling. Agent-based models allow a high level of
specificity in the daily actions and behavior of their agents, but some of this behavior
must be simplified and generalized. For example, we assume that agents interact
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with their household members every day, that every student has the same probability
of interacting with other students in their age group, and that agents preferably
interact with agents who live near them rather than far away. The model does not
account for mass-gathering events, such as theme parks and churches, which have
been linked to outbreaks,65,66 nor does it account for potential infections from
healthcare-seeking behavior, such as in doctor’s offices and hospital waiting rooms.
The model does not stratify agents along cultural or religious lines,54,67,68 instead
relying on household locations, school locations, and school type (private or public).
Alternative modeling approaches make other assumptions: the classic SIR-type
model of epidemiology69 assumes everyone within a compartment interacts equally
with one another at all times, for example. In this model, as with all models, the
simplifications must be considered along with the results.
The vaccination rate data published by the Texas Department of State Health
Services48 is limited by law and school responses. Texas law mandates that all
schools and districts report the vaccination coverage of their students; however, only
83% responded in the 2017–2018 school year. Data from individual public schools
is not published, in part due to privacy concerns,70 necessitating the use of schooldistrict aggregated data. We assume that geographically close public schools are
likely to have a similar vaccination coverage; however, if there are individual public
schools with low vaccination rates, our forecasts may underestimate potential
outbreak sizes. Legislative bills to allow individual public school data to be published
have failed in recent years.71,72
We assume that home-schooled students have vaccination rates consistent with
the general population, as vaccination rates are not collected for home-schooled
students in Texas. As Texas allows unvaccinated children to enroll in schools, there
is not a strong motivation for vaccine-hesitant parents to home-school. Homeschooled students represent a small fraction of school students and can be assumed
to interact with fewer other students than their school-attending peers, suggesting
they do not have a large effect on the spread of infectious diseases.
We would not expect a different home-school vaccination rate to greatly alter the
relative benefit of each intervention, as the interventions are only applied to children
in schools (although outbreak sizes would change). However, vaccination
interventions may be slightly less effective, as more schoolchildren would become
infected before developing immunity.
Not all medically exempt students are susceptible to measles: some students are
exempt due to prior measles infection. However, medically exempt students make
up a very small fraction of the student population and, in places where there have
not been large or regular measles outbreaks, it is likely that most medically exempt
students are not exempt due to prior infection.
The forecast number of measles cases presented here is slightly different from
those in previous work using FRED.34 These differences are due to a few factors:
updates in the counties present in the MSAs (here the September 2018 38 boundaries
were used; previously the July 2015 boundaries were used73); updates in the FRED
code, requiring recalibration of the transmissibility of measles; and different seeds
for random-number generators.
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Conclusions
Simulations of measles outbreaks in Texas find that 2 types of interventions enacted
during outbreaks, suspending unvaccinated students from school and mandatory
vaccinations, are associated with reductions in the potential number of measles
cases by up to 96%. Suspending students from school is associated with the fewest
measles cases. At 2018 vaccination rates, suspending and vaccinating students
concurrently has no significant reduction in the potential number of cases compared
to only suspending students, provided out-of-school contacts do not increase during
the suspension. Further, at 2018 vaccination rates, policies that affect all schools in
a metropolitan area have no significant reduction in the number of cases compared
to policies which only target schools with measles cases. Only suspending
unvaccinated students in schools with measles cases leads to 10–100 factor
reduction in total school days suspended by all students, compared to suspending
all unvaccinated students in a metropolitan area. However, if vaccination rates drop
5% in schools that were undervaccinated in 2018, area-wide policies are forecast to
be more beneficial. These results only evaluate interventions taken during an
outbreak; vaccination before an outbreak is the most effective means of reducing
outbreak sizes.
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Appendix 1. Forecast number of cases with 2018 vaccination rates. Forecast number of measles cases with different policy interventions are
provided. Forecasts use 2018 school vaccination rates in 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Forecasts with different interventions
are provided. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario.
Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses.

Intervention

AustinRound RockGeorgetown

None

527
(466-572)

11
(9–11)

477
(462–497)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in school

19
(17–21)

9
(8–9)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in area
then unsuspend by case free
schools

18
(16–20)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in area

BeaumontPort Arthur

DallasFort WorthArlington

HoustonSugar LandBaytown

Midland

Tyler

53
(44–81)

22
(18–25)

146
(141–160)

26
(20–28)

17
(15–20)

12
(11–13)

19
(17–20)

9
(8–9)

24
(20–27)

16
(14–20)

12
(11–13)

18
(17–19)

17
(15–20)

8
(8–9)

23
(19–26)

16
(14–18)

12
(11–13)

18
(16–19)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in school

49
(43–59)

10
(8–12)

75
(67–84)

32
(27–41)

15
(14–17)

42
(36–44)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in area

50
(43–53)

9
(8–10)

60
(55–71)

24
(20–29)

16
(14–17)

38
(35–42)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
measles in school

18
(16–20)

9
(7–9)

22
(20–25)

17
(14–18)

12
(10–13)

19
(16–18)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
measles in area
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18
(17–20)

8
(8–10)

22
(20–25)

16
(15–19)

12
(10–13)

17
(17–20)
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Appendix 2. Forecast number of cases if vaccination rates drop 5% in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Forecast number of
measles cases with different policy interventions are provided. Forecasts use a 5% drop from 2018 school vaccination rates in schools which,
in 2018, are undervaccinated, for 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Forecasts with different interventions are provided. Values
are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval on the
95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses.

Intervention

AustinRound RockGeorgetown

Beaumont-Port
Arthur

None

1503
(1295–1691)

103
(91–126)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in school

34
(31–39)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in area
then unsuspend by case free
schools
Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in area

DallasFort WorthArlington

Houston-Sugar
Land-Baytown

Midland

Tyler

1445
(1213–1596)

1634
(1436–1848)

152
(127–165)

337
(306–359)

21
(19–23)

35
(30–41)

45
(39–52)

22
(21–25)

24
(21–26)

29
(27–33)

17
(15–19)

32
(28–36)

31
(28–35)

19
(16–20)

22
(20–24)

24
(21–26)

15
(14–17)

24
(21–27)

22
(20–24)

16
(15–18)

20
(18–22)

132
(113–153)

38
(31–40)

157
(115–181)

185
(154–210)

44
(39–49)

61
(54–72)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in area

49
(43–53)

25
(22–26)

44
(36–50)

41
(38–45)

29
(28–32)

42
(38–49)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
measles in school

33
(30–37)

17
(16–20)

34
(31–36)

39
(35–46)

21
(18–24)

23
(21–26)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
measles in area

22
(20–24)

14
(13–16)

20
(19–22)

22
(20–23)

15
(14–16)

18
(17–20)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in school
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Appendix 3. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions (1000s). Forecasts use the 2018 school vaccination
rates in 6 Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The total number of days each unvaccinated student was suspended from their school
was summed for 4 intervention scenarios that mandate student suspensions. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations,
which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric
bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses.

Intervention
Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in
school
Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in
area
Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
in school
Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
in area
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AustinRound RockGeorgetown
6.2
5.7–6.7)
237.7
(225.2–254.4)
4.5
(4.0–5.1)
195.9
(184.7–209.5)

BeaumontPort Arthur

DallasFort WorthArlington

0.9
(0.8–1.1)

9.1
(7.9–10.7)

19.8
(17.8–20.3)
0.7
(0.5–0.8)
12.9
(11.9–13.6)

789.5
(747.6–827.3)
6.9
(5.9–7.3)
626.7
(587.4–690.6)

HoustonSugar LandBaytown
4.8
(4.0–6.7)
1132.5
(1053.9–1214.8)
4.0
(3.2–4.5)
843.8
(762.7–918.2)

Midland

Tyler

1.0
(0.9–1.0)

4.5
(4.3–4.7)

6.8
(6.4–7.1)
0.7
(0.7–0.8)
5.1
(4.7–5.3)

20.0
(18.8–20.7)
3.2
(3.1–3.4)
16.5
(14.80–17.6)

23
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Appendix 4. Forecast number of student-days suspended after measles introductions (1000s). Forecasts use a 5% drop from 2018 school
vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated for six Texas metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The total number of days
each unvaccinated student was suspended from their school was summed for 4 intervention scenarios that mandate student suspensions.
Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario. Confidence interval
on the 95th percentile value, calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap estimate, is provided in parentheses.
AustinRound RockGeorgetown

BeaumontPort Arthur

DallasFort WorthArlington

HoustonSugar LandBaytown

Midland

Tyler

Suspend unvaccinated.
students if measles in
school

20.0
(17.9–21.7)

7.3
(6.5–8.3)

19.1
(15.9–22.5)

32.0
(26.5–38.2)

8.3
(7.5–9.3)

8.0
(7.2–8.6)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in
area

1000.0
(915.9–1070.8)

135.8
(123.1–141.2)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
in school

13.6
(12.4–15.3)

4.7
(4.2–5.3)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
in area

736.9
(705.5–797.5)

87.8
(83.0–95.6)

Intervention

https://digitalcommons.library.tmc.edu/childrenatrisk/vol10/iss2/10

4640.1
5101.1
86.2 (81.8–90.2)
(4384.7–4898.6) (4808.8–5536.2)
13.7
(12.1–15.0)

20.6
(17.8–23.4)

3316.0
3752.2
(3178.5–3481.8) (3574.8–4010.3)

62.4
(58.6–65.6)

5.5
(5.1–5.8)

5.5
(5.0–6.2)

59.8
(56.2–64.3)

46.0
(43.3–48.0)
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Appendix 5. Forecast outbreak sizes if interventions are applied only to “refusers” (1000s), compared to when interventions are applied to
both refusers and students who are medically ineligible for vaccination. Forecasts given for 2018 vaccination rates, and for a 5% drop from
2018 school vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated. Forecasts for different intervention policies in Austin-Round
Rock-Georgetown. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case scenario.
Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value is provided in parentheses.
2018 vaccination rate

2018 vaccination rate -5%

Refusers and
medically ineligible

Refusers only

Refusers and
medically ineligible

Refusers only

527
(466–572)

n/a

1503
(1295–1691)

n/a

Suspend unvaccinated students if
measles in school

19
(17–21)

18
(17–18)

34
(31–39)

34
(31–38)

Suspend unvaccinated students if
measles in area

17
(15–20)

18
(16–18)

24
(21–26)

23
(22–24)

Suspend & vaccinate unvaccinated
students if in school

18
(16–20)

18
(17–18)

33
(30–37)

33
(31–35)

Suspend & vaccinate unvaccinated
students if in area

18
(17–20)

21
(18–21)

22
(20–24)

21
(19–22)

Intervention
None
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Appendix 6. Forecast number of measles cases for 3 different contact distributions. The 3 contact distributions represent different
estimates of the mean ratio of contacts made in households, workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods provided in Table 1. Forecasts are
given for 2018 vaccination rates, and for a 5% drop from 2018 school vaccination rates in schools which, in 2018, are undervaccinated.
Forecasts for different intervention policies in Austin-Round Rock-Georgetown. Vaccination policies only applied to refusers and not
medically ineligible students. Values are the 95th percentile in cases from 1000 simulations, which we assume to be a plausible worst-case
scenario. Confidence interval on the 95th percentile value is provided in parentheses.
2018 vaccinate rate
Intervention
None

Distribution 1
527
(466–572)

Distribution 2
517
(459–584)

2018 vaccinate rate -5%
Distribution 3
415
(348–451)

Distribution 1

Distribution 2

Distribution 3

1503
(1295–1691)

1636
(1472–1851)

1437
(1180–1686)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in
school

19
(17–21)

21
(19–23)

19
(17–20)

34
(31–39)

34
(32–38)

31
(27–34)

Suspend unvaccinated
students if measles in area

18
(16–20)

20
(18–21)

18
(17–20)

24
(21–26)

24
(23–25)

20
(19–22)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in
school

49
(43–59)

62
(55–73)

59
(52–68)

132
(113–153)

163
(145–188)

135
(120–155)

Vaccinate unvaccinated
students if measles in area

50
(43–53)

57
(51–62)

56
(46–62)

49
(43–53)

52
(47–59)

55
(50–65)

Suspend & vaccinate
unvaccinated students if
measles in school

18
(16–20)

21
(16–21)

19
(15–19)

33
(30–37)

36
(30–38)

30
(27–33)

Suspend & vaccinate.
unvaccinated students if
measles in area

18
(17–20)

19
(18–23)

17
(17–22)

22
(20–24)

20
(19–22)

19
(18–21)
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